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Abstract: Control systems on board ships collect sensor measurements and data from various 
operational activities and display all the relevant information; they also facilitate relaying of 
control commands to local or remote equipment. Distributed control systems (DCS) are 
typically used within a single process or generating plant; supervisory control and data 
acquisition (SCADA) systems are used for larger-scale environments. The SCADA system 
communications infrastructure tends to be slower and less reliable, and so the remote terminal 
unit in a SCADA system has local control schemes to handle that eventuality. Security in 
general and cyber security specifically were not the major concerns of early standalone 
maritime SCADA systems. Security was primarily achieved by controlling physical access to 
system components, which were unique and used proprietary communication protocols. For 
years, security in SCADA systems was viewed as just an implication of safety. Over the last 
decade, however, the situation has changed, and numerous standards/directives dealing with 
the cyber security of SCADA systems have emerged. Characteristics of maritime SCADA 
cyber security are discussed; related training needs are identified next. The pedagogical 
approaches are also presented in order to train seafarers in risk assessment, prevention and 
mitigation strategies related with maritime SCADA cyber security risks.  
 
Keywords: Cyber Security; Training Needs; Maritime Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisition (SCADA) Systems. 
 
 
Introduction   
 
Ships today are quite complex systems to design, build and maintain throughout their life-cycle. 
Contemporary sea-going vessels are equipped with a wide variety of technologically advanced 
systems and are associated with an extremely high level of automation. It is a rather self-
explanatory fact that the continuous improvement and integration/interconnection of electronic 
systems (most commonly termed as the “network-centric” approach), have created a rather 
different operating environment for the shipping industry, when compared with the prevailing 
model of just two decades ago. At that time, the exploitation of data exchange between 
interconnected equipment and systems on vessels engaged with maritime transport tasks, was 
relying mainly on stove-piped architectures and applications. However nowadays, the issues 
of connectivity and interconnection are clearly standing out when examining the prevailing 
trends in ships’ design and equipment. Furthermore, easy access to various computer systems, 
and quite often in the so-called “remote mode”, is holding a pivotal role during the conduct of 
operations -both on board a modern ship, as well as in relation to an extended number of related 
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activities ashore, with indicative examples in this domain being provided by various remote 
sensing and maintenance tasks (Dalaklis et all, 2020). 
 
The seas and oceans of our planet are now well integrated into the Internet (most often via 
satellite support); this global coverage has provided the opportunity for shipping companies to 
reduce costs across supply/demand chains, improve customer services, and even redefine their 
way of conducting operations. Modern ships are being transformed into “remote offices at sea”; 
applications like voice over IP (Internet Protocol), email and instant messaging are now used 
on-board contemporary sea-going vessels on a daily basis. However, this new and 
“interconnected world” that is also strongly associated with an on-going digitalisation trend 
within the maritime industry itself is simultaneously associated with very significant risks, 
which in case they are not effectively and timely addressed, can result into really devastative 
outcomes. On the positive side and with a quite forward looking approach, during July 2017, 
the International Maritime Organization (IMO) already approved Guidelines on maritime cyber 
risk management (MSC-FAL.1/Circ.3) in order to provide high-level recommendations on 
maritime cyber risk management, to safeguard shipping from current and emerging cyber 
threats and vulnerabilities. The adoption of Resolution MSC.428(98), which brought the 
importance of Cyber Security to the forward of attention, is also clearly standing out.  
 
The European Union’s Agency for Cybersecurity has already pointed out that the contemporary 
heavily industrialised world is constantly changing, including the introduction and/or further 
modification of technologies and associated business models that are needed to adapt towards 
“new” and evolving market requirements (ENISA, 2014). One of the most transcendental 
adaptations that the maritime transport industry is currently experiencing is the convergence 
between Operations Technology (OT), the operations needed to carry out the industrial 
processes, and Information Technology (IT), the use of computers to manage data needed by 
the organisation’s enterprise processes. This convergence has many advantages (optimisation 
of operations, better use of resources, cost savings, etc.), but on the other hand it increases the 
need for cyber security of industrial control systems (ICS) and Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisition (SCADA) systems. Initially, SCADA systems were used mainly in power 
transmission, gas pipeline and water distribution control systems. However, in recent year their 
use has expanded significantly and nowadays they are found extensively on-board ships. 
SCADA systems stand out among other ICSs, as systems that (1) monitor and control assets 
distributed over large geographical areas, and (2) use specific control equipment such as a 
Master Terminal Unit (MTU) and (various) Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) and are therefore 
exposed to cyber security risks (Cherdantseva et all, 2015). The Control Systems framework 
and the technical components of the basic SCADA structure are presented in Figure 1.  
  
Figure 1. Use and technical components of a SCADA system. 
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Created by the authors, via adaption of certain slides from the presentation: Woudenberg, B. 
(2012). SCADA Right Now, Retrieved from https://slideplayer.com/slide/5703843/ June 2021 
 
Control systems on board ships collect sensor measurements and data from various operational 
activities and display all the relevant information; they also facilitate relaying of control 
commands to local or remote equipment. Distributed control systems (DCS) are typically used 
within a single process or generating plant; SCADA systems are most often used for larger-
scale environments. Security in general and cyber security specifically were not the major 
concerns of early standalone maritime SCADA systems. Security was primarily achieved by 
controlling physical access to system components, which were unique and used proprietary 
communication protocols (Cherdantseva et all, 2015). For many years, security in SCADA 
systems was viewed as just an implication of safety. Over the last decade, however, the 
situation has changed, and that paradigm is not valid in the contemporary “well interconnected 
world”. It is indicative of the fact that numerous standards/directives dealing with the cyber 
security of SCADA systems have emerged, as an initial response to the specific need. In any 
case, this aforementioned convergence between OT and IT, which affects hundreds of 
thousands of industrial systems worldwide, implies that professionals with knowledge of cyber 
security for ICS/SCADA will be needed. However, currently, there are very few professionals 
with the proven skills available to do this work. Following a rather simplistic qualitative 
approach, characteristics of maritime SCADA cyber security are discussed first and related 
training needs are identified next. The main aim is to identify the “right” pedagogical 
approaches which can be deployed in order to train seafarers in risk assessment, prevention and 
mitigation strategies related with maritime SCADA cyber security risks.  
 
Importance of Cyber Security    
 
The contemporary era is very frequently referred to as “the information age”; cyber-attacks on 
the wider maritime industry (and especially on the relevant port IT systems) should no longer 
be considered hypothetical or simply the stuff of over-exaggerating analysts, resembling a 
fictional narrative. Probably a very strong “wake up” message was sent in June 2017, when the 
Maersk shipping company was hit by a cyber-attack from the purely destructive NotPetya virus 
(Boyes et all, 2020). The virus entered Maersk’s systems through a widely used piece of tax 
accounting software in Ukraine. Maersk was not the intended target for the attack, but the 
consequences for the company were very real. The virus spread through the company globally 
and made all their applications and data unavailable for several days. Real world operations, 
including its extremely important Rotterdam terminal, were seriously affected, or even 
completely crippled, with relevant financial losses being estimated at the level of $200-300 
million. The Maersk story testifies how a system that fails in key ways becomes unusable, even 
if certain parts of it remain unaffected: Maersk's shipboard systems were fine, but there was no 
way to distribute their loads or take on new cargo (Dalaklis and Schröder-Hinrichs, 2019). 
 
It is a self-explanatory fact that the NotPetya virus could attack the Maersk global network 
because it was loaded onto one unpatched computer operating in a single local office, which in 
turn was connected to the company’s global network. This incident shows the vulnerability of 
everyone to cyber-attacks: you do not even have to be the intended victim. On a positive note, 
Maersk could recover relatively quickly because it had already recognised that resilience and 
recovery processes are as important in terms of the wider Cyber Security framework as trying 
to prevent an attack. Being able to recover all your systems and data from secure backups 
within a very short timeframe of a successful cyber-attack will protect your business from 
potentially serious financial and the more important reputational damage. Spreading of viruses 
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through the computer systems that are serving the wider needs of the maritime industry is just 
a small part of the complex equation. In other cyber security incidents, IT assets have been 
quite often infected with malware and in numerous occasions it has been recorded unintentional 
jamming or interference with wireless networks (Boyes et all, 2020). 
 
In order to bring forward a widely accepted definition, “Cyber Security” can be described as 
“the collection of tools, policies, security concepts, security safeguards, guidelines, risk 
management approaches, actions, training, best practices, assurance and technologies that 
can be used to protect the cyber environment and organisation and user’s assets” (International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU), 2008). Within this definition, the “cyber environment” 
comprises the standalone computers and interconnected networks of both information and 
operational technology that use electronic, computer-based and wireless systems, including 
information, services, social and business functions that exist only in cyberspace. At the same 
time, the “organisation and user’s assets” includes connected and standalone computing 
devices, personnel, infrastructure, applications, services, telecommunication systems, and the 
totality of transmitted, processed or stored data in the cyber environment. Cyber security is not 
just about preventing hackers gaining access to systems and information. It also addresses the 
maintenance, integrity, confidentiality and availability of information and systems, ensuring 
business continuity and the continuing utility of cyber assets. Before moving to a different 
direction, it is worth clearly highlighting the fact that on board a modern ship there are 
numerous SCADA systems. With the help of Figure 2, an attempt to summarize all ICS that 
can be found on a modern vessel is taking place; a few indicative examples of interest are also 
listed next: Alarm and Monitoring System; Auxiliary Control System; Power Management 
System; Cargo Control System; Propulsion Control System; Ballast Automation System; Air 
Conditioning System; Anti–Heeling; Reefer Monitoring; Fire System; Main Engine 
Monitoring System. Furthermore, a representation of the IT environment supporting the 
conduct of a shipping company’s business and other activities, as well as how the use of these 
computers relates to maritime SCADA is provided.   
  
Figure 2 ICS on-board a vessel and the wider framework of maritime SCADA. 
Created by the authors, via adaption of certain slides from the presentation: Woudenberg, B. 
(2012). SCADA Right Now, Retrieved from https://slideplayer.com/slide/5703843/ June 2021 
 
The main vulnerabilities that are related to SCADA systems are (Woudenberg, 2012; Nikitakos 
2017): The adoption of standardized technologies with known vulnerabilities; The connectivity 
of many control systems via, through, within, or exposed to unsecured networks, networked 
portals, or mechanisms connected to unsecured networks (which includes the Internet); 
Implementation constraints of existing security technologies and practices within the existing 
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control systems infrastructure (and its architectures); The connectivity of insecure remote 
devices in their connections to control systems; The widespread availability of technical 
information about control systems, most notably via publicly available and/or shared 
networked resources such as the Internet; Disrupt the operations of control systems by delaying 
or blocking the flow of information through the networks supporting the control systems, 
thereby denying availability of the networks to control systems’ operators and production 
control managers; Attempt, or succeed, at making unauthorized changes to programmed 
instructions within PLC, RTU, or DCS controllers, change alarm thresholds, or issue 
unauthorized commands to control station equipment; Send falsified information to control 
system operators either to disguise unauthorized changes or to initiate inappropriate actions; 
Modify or alter control system software or firmware such that the net effect produces 
unpredictable results (such as introducing a computer “time bomb”); Interfere with the 
operation and processing of safety systems; Many control systems are vulnerable to attacks of 
varying degrees. These attack attempts range from telephone line sweeps (a.k.a. “wardialing”), 
to wireless network sniffing (a.k.a. “wardriving”), to physical network port scanning, and to 
physical monitoring and intrusion (Nikitakos, 2017)  
 
It is also necessary to mention that there are several types of exploiting maritime ICS/SCADA. 
A limited number of them is discussed next: Direct physical damage to affected equipment 
and systems. By exploiting an ICS, the controlled mechanism can fail with catastrophic results, 
damaging a single piece of equipment, interrupting a larger system, or disabling or destroying 
an entire ship; Small-scale, local disruptions. They can damage or interrupt individual 
systems or single ships within a single organization, without widespread impact beyond the 
affected function or service; Injury or death to operators, passengers or the general public. 
An incident can affect a single operator or a larger number of crewmembers or bystanders. 
Targeted attacks on a critical for safety equipment can result into a fire, or explosion that could 
injure or kill hundreds of people; Catastrophic disruptions to the transportation system. A 
vessel sunk in a shipping channel, an explosion at an oil or LNG facility, sabotage to canal 
locks, or a series of mishaps involving cargo container cranes in critical ports can have long-
term impacts to the safety, stability and reliability of very crucial elements of the wider 
transportation system (Nikitakos, 2017; Boyes et al, 2020). 
 
Knowledge areas  
 
The most important knowledge areas for concerned professionals have been identified, by 
taking into account the existing ICS/SCADA Cyber Security Certification schemes and other 
relevant studies. The following uses as reference the work done under the ERNCIP (European 
Reference Network for Critical Infrastructure). One of its subgroups has focused on defining 
the competences, qualifications and experience needed by ICS Cyber Security Professionals. 
The result is a high level overview of the knowledge areas that need to be developed; they are 
summarized with the help of Figure 3. Of very specific interest are the following (ENISA, 
2014): General Information Technology. This domain includes an introduction to IT 
architecture to Networking and Communications, systems development and software, data 
management and finally an overview of standards and processes. It is considered as the basic 
step for any certification related to Maritime SCADA taking into account the complexity that 
the trainee will face in the next steps; Cyber Security & Information Risk Management. 
The vulnerabilities and the complexity of several attacks makes risk management very essential 
for the Maritime SCADA Knowledge area. Risk management includes several methods for risk 
identification, (PHA/HAZOP usage), methodologies and procedures for risk acceptance, 
application of possible risk control options and finally risk/mitigation plan); Industrial 
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Automation Control and Safeguarding. This is the main area given the variety of several 
maritime SCADA on board of ships. It includes topics such as maritime networking and 
Architecture, embedded device and control for maritime SCADA, Operating environment and 
hazards particularly on board of a ship.  Maritime process Safety management, relevant 
standards and procedures from other sectors. 
 
Figure 3 Knowledge areas relating to education and training activities for maritime SCADA. 
Created by the Authors, via adaptation from European Union Agency for Cybersecurity. (2014). 
Certification of Cyber Security skills of ICS/SCADA professionals: Good practices and 




Proposed curriculum development  
 
Benjamin Bloom was one of the first scientists who systematically categorized the educational 
objectives and the related educational goals. The so-called “Bloom’s taxonomy” is one of the 
main principles of the educational sciences, which has been revised and updated in the last 
years (Bloom, 1956; Bloom 1969). In general, the taxonomy forms a hierarchical model for 
the classification of educational learning objectives into levels of specificity and complexity. 
The overall method tries to enhance the communication between educators on the design of 
curricula, exercises, and examinations. It has been adopted by related teaching philosophies 
that lean more on skills rather than on content. It consists of 6 layers, with the 3 bottom levels 
(remembering, understanding, and applying) denoting the basic understanding of the examined 
topic, while the coverage of the 3 top ones (analyzing, evaluating, and creating) reveals that 
the trainee has achieved a higher-order of thinking. The first three layers assess the trainee’s 
knowledge about the teaching content while skill development is promoted with “higher-order 
thinking”. This also forms the final aim of the Bloom’s taxonomy—building a culture of 
thinking. The Blooms taxonomy was chosen for the scope of our study, but since the topic of 
cyber security in relation to maritime SCADA systems is also associated with a very practical 
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element in terms of training requirements, it was combined with so called Work Based 
Learning (WBL), which is an educational strategy that provides students with real-life work 
experiences where they can apply academic and technical skills and develop their 
employability. 
The discussion revolves around a series of educational courses which will integrate the 
theoretical curriculum with the workplace to create a different learning paradigm. It has already 
been pointed out that: “Work-based learning deliberately merges theory with practice and 
acknowledges the intersection of explicit and tacit forms of knowing” (Raelin, 1997). Most 
WBL programs are generally university accredited courses, aiming at a win-win situation 
where the learner's needs and the industry requirement for skilled and talented employees are 
both met. WBL programs are targeted to bridge the gap between the learning and the doing. 
Work-based learning strategies provide career awareness, career exploration opportunities, 
career planning activities and help students attain competencies such as positive work attitudes 
and other employable skills (Hamilton, S.F. & Hamilton, M.A. 1998; Stasz & Brewer, 1998). 
WBL encompasses a diversity of formal, non-formal and informal arrangements including 
apprenticeships, work placement and informal learning on the job. The key driver is the need 
for active policies to secure learning that meets the need of the workplace.  
 
Indicative WBL strategies could include the following (Hamilton, S.F. & Hamilton, M.A., 
1998; Stasz & Brewer, 1998; Axcelerate, 2020): Apprenticeship or internship or 
mentorship. An apprenticeship involves the student working for an employer where he or she 
is taught and supervised by an experienced employee of the chosen organization. The student 
is periodically evaluated for progress as per the skills and knowledge acquired, and maybe 
granted wages accordingly. At the end of the course, the student receives a certificate of service. 
The student learns in a realistic environment and gets the opportunity to apply his or her 
knowledge in real-world scenarios; Job shadowing. Job Shadowing is a short term opportunity 
that introduces the student to a particular job or career by pairing the student with an employee 
of the workplace. By following or 'shadowing' the employee, the student gets familiar with the 
duties and responsibilities associated with that job; Business/industry field trip. Field trips 
offer the students an insight in the latest technical advancements and business strategies of an 
enterprise. Students also gain awareness of the various career opportunities available and 
understand the driving forces of the community's economy; Entrepreneurial experience. This 
includes setting up of specific business, right from the planning, organizing and managing stage 
to the risk control and management aspects of a business; Cooperative education. In 
cooperative education, the work experience is planned in conjunction with the technical 
classroom instruction. This method is used by universities that do not have access to state-of-
art equipment required to transact the technical course practically; School-based enterprise. 
A school-based enterprise is a simulated or actual business run by the school. It offers students 
a learning experience by letting them manage the various aspects of a business; Service 
learning. This strategy combines community service with career, where students provide 
volunteer service to public and non-profit agencies, civic and government offices etc. 
 
Summary and Conclusion  
 
During recent years, the wider maritime industry (ports included) has been undergoing a digital 
transformation in order to effectively meet emerging business challenges, optimise existing 
business and operational processes, as well as introducing new capabilities, such as automation 
and real-time monitoring of operations. Especially in the maritime sector, a large volume of 
data is produced from a very extended pool of relevant sources (i.e. systems supporting the 
conduct of navigation and/or ship’s machinery, as well as related marine fleet management 
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systems etc.), on a daily basis. This digitalisation trend has been based on the interconnectivity 
of Information Technology (IT) and Operation Technology (OT) assets and the introduction of 
new technological enablers, such as cloud computing, big data and Internet of Things (IoT). 
However, this phenomenon is also creating numerous challenges, since in an “interconnected 
world” the whole security chain is as strong as its weakest link. On the positive side, the various 
implications of Cyber Security have been discussed at the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO) and as a very timely response, the adoption of Resolution MSC.428(98), which aims to 
address cyber risks in the shipping industry, is pushing forward with the first initial step: raising 
awareness thought all involved stakeholders. Furthermore, this IMO resolution is creating a 
framework of effectively addressing cyber risks as a part of the already existing safety 
management systems, within the ISM Code. It clearly establishes the obligation of Maritime 
Administrations and concerned shipping companies to ensure that the existing safety 
management systems appropriately address cyber risks and cyber security for ships by their 
2021 annual verification. 
 
The field of risk assessment related to cyber security and especially with ICS/SCADA is a new 
and quite complex domain; concerned maritime personnel, most often receive “random” 
training offerings by several different manufacturers and are then expected to effectively deal 
with an extended portfolio of security incidents. In this paper, targeted knowledge areas that 
were considered as essential for certification were identified first; then, by using Bloom’s 
taxonomy and in combination with a work-based learning (WBL) approach, relevant training 
strategies were discussed and their advantages and drawbacks were also highlighted. Cutting a 
long way short, WBL is an educational method that immerses students in the workplace, 
prompting them to learn about the environment in which they’ll be working, and to complete 
typical tasks for the company. The WBL approach is relatively new in the maritime sector, but 
it looks like it fits with the particular complexities for security risks related with maritime 
SCADA. As it was already very clearly explained, WBL encompasses a wide portfolio of 
formal, non-formal and informal arrangements including apprenticeships, work placement and 
informal learning on the job. Needless to mention: the maritime industry is already relying on 
the job training and mentoring to create and further improve competencies in relation to the 
maritime profession; this transition towards WBL will not require a significant paradigm shift. 
Last, but not least, the “hot to implement” these particular training strategies should be included 
as a future research topic; examining more carefully the adoption of the “right” methods and 
tools for the concerned instructors and facilitating the easy understanding of the trainees must 
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